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Abstract
This Article is composed of three Parts. Part I reviews the establishment of the SEZs in North
Korea. This Part will introduce four SEZs currently in action and the grand scheme of the Tumen
River Area Development Project. The backgrounds, purposes, and roles of the SEZs will also
be addressed in this part. Part II deals with the legal instruments of North Korea involved in the
economic reformation in these zones. This Part will systematically analyze the laws and regu-
lations relating to inducing foreign investment in SEZs. Part III investigates protection against
political risks in the SEZs, which is one of the critical issues in international economic relations.
In the case of North Korea, which is currently undergoing the political disturbance of the nuclear
standoff, foreign investors are likely very concerned with protection of their investments in North
Korea. After searching for the international legal principles and methods for the protection against
political risks, this Part will explore actual laws and regulations of North Korea available to guar-
antee the legal rights and interests of foreign investors. A few provisional agreements between
North Korea and South Korea will be discussed in the final Part.
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The year 2002 was a landmark year for economic reforma-
tion in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("North Ko-
rea" or "DPRK"). Since the announcement of the Reform Mea-
sures for the Economic Management (the "Measures") on July
1st of that year, a series of plans and policies have been initiated
and implemented by the economic staff of Kim Jong-il's regime.
The Measures include epoch-making contents. Some parts of
the Measures may imply the fundamental change of North Ko-
rea's dogmatic socialist economic system that Pyongyang had
maintained for about half a century. With the Measures, North
Korea established a price system, and it virtually put an end to
the distribution mechanism in food, housing and energy that is
symbolic of a socialist economy. Following the adoption of the
price system, salaries and market price both enormously in-
creased, which should result in stimulating the pursuit of indi-
vidual profits in the market. These changes not only made the
State decentralize its role in economic policymaking, but they
also required enterprises to have more responsibilities with self-
control.'
Crucial contents of the Measures have been realized
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through the special economic zones ("SEZs"). So far, four SEZs
have been actively working or been under construction in the
territory of North Korea. They are the Kaesung Industrial Com-
plex, the Mt. Kumgangsan Special Tourist Region, the Rajin-
Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone, and the Shinuiju Spe-
cial Administrative Region. Although each SEZ has its own spe-
cial objectives - an independent and reformative management
system has been or will be applied to all the SEZs - this proce-
dure is totally different from the traditional socialist economic
principle because it can induce foreign investment more effi-
ciently. The SEZs are the laboratories of North Korea's reforma-
tion projects in recent days. They cover the economic field as
well as the political field. Moreover, the international influence
in the construction of the SEZs has brought a degree of stability
guaranteed by law. It is thus timely and meaningful to examine
North Korea's SEZs, economic reformation laws, and policies
within an international law framework.
This Article is composed of three Parts. Part I reviews the
establishment of the SEZs in North Korea. This Part will intro-
duce four SEZs currently in action and the grand scheme of the
Tumen River Area Development Project. The backgrounds, pur-
poses, and roles of the SEZs will also be addressed in this part.
Part II deals with the legal instruments of North Korea involved
in the economic reformation in these zones. This Part will sys-
tematically analyze the laws and regulations relating to inducing
foreign investment in SEZs. Part III investigates protection
against political risks in the SEZs, which is one of the critical
issues in international economic relations. In the case of North
Korea, which is currently undergoing the political disturbance of
the nuclear standoff, foreign investors are likely very concerned
with protection of their investments in North Korea. After
searching for the international legal principles and methods for
the protection against political risks, this Part will explore actual
laws and regulations of North Korea available to guarantee the
legal rights and interests of foreign investors. A few provisional
agreements between North Korea and South Korea will be dis-
cussed in the final Part.
A perspective of international law will be maintained
throughout this Article, not only because the SEZs themselves
are international regions, but also because most foreign invest-
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ments there are closely dependent on the peaceful relations with
the other country.
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN
NORTH KOREA
A. Grand Scheme: Tumen River Area Development Project
North Korean economic reformation through SEZs was
originally ignited under the continental context of the Tumen
River Area Development Project ("TRADP") .2 The TRADP, offi-
cially launched in 1992 as a regional project of the United Na-
tions Development Program ("UNDP"), developed into a more
attractive intra-regional economic cooperation project among
the five Member States' in December of 1995.' At the first stage,
it was just a small project that might develop a Tumen River Eco-
nomic Zone ("TREZ"), composed of a delta area connecting
China's Hunchun, North Korea's Rajin, and Russia's Psyet. As
the meetings went on, however, Member States began to discuss
the legal and institutional framework to upgrade this project
into a major engine for propelling Northeast Asian regional eco-
nomic cooperation and prosperity.5
The TRADP has so far evolved into two different conceptual
master plans. One is the "cross-border cooperation" between
Member States;6 the other is the "gateway construction" of
Northeast Asia.7 A primary goal of the TRADP is to create a new
growth center of international trade and economic cooperation
2. See Li Haeng-ho, Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia and the Tumen River Delta
Area Development, 1 E. ASIAN REV. 99 (1997). On the grand plan of the TRADP, see
GROWTH TRIANGLES IN ASIA: A NEW APPROACH TO REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION
(Myo Thant ct al. eds., 1998).
3. Original parties to this project are China, Mongolia, and North and South Ko-
rea. The Russian Federation joined later. For more details, see THE KOREA TIMES, Oct.
26, 1991.
4. See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM ET AL. ("UNDP"), STUDY OF THE
COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT BANKING NEEDS IN THE TUMEN RIVER ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT AREA 17-19 (1997).
5. See ERIC YONG-JOONG LEE, LEGAL ISSUES OF INTER-KoREAN ECONOMIC COOPERA-
TION UNDER THE ARMISTICE SYSTEM 108-37, 176, 188-93 (2002).
6. See United Nations Development Program ("UNDP"), The Tumen Programme,
at http://www.tumenprogramme.org/tumen/programme/index/view (last visited
Apr. 9, 2004).
7. See Kim Si-Jin, The Tumen Programme: The DPRK Perspective, Presentation at
the Ninth Northeast Asia Economic Forum, at http://www.tumenprogramme.org/
tumen/publications/speeches/ 1999-10%20Tianjin/kimsijin/view (Oct. 1999).
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in Northeast Asia.8 To obtain this goal, the Member States of
the TRADP are promoting cross-border cooperation by both in-
tegrating their infrastructures and encouraging the free move-
ment of goods and people. The SEZs have been established as
an important master plan of cross-border economic coopera-
tion. Each SEZ is supposed to be a hub connecting different
markets between the Member States. The second objective of
the TRADP is to increase the area's strength as a gateway towards
the grand Asia-Pacific market. This macro-plan is designed to
connect the markets of China, North Korea, and Russia to Japan,
South Korea, and, ultimately, the United States' economic
sphere.9 By 2010, they aim to complete a comprehensive, mod-
ern international trade center for the twenty-first century.10
North Korea has been deeply interested in the TRADP, and
it has been a crucial participant since the first meeting of the
Northeast Asia Economic Forum held in Changchun in July of
1990. Under this project, North Korea has been given first prior-
ity to develop Rajin-Sonbong area into a free trade and eco-
nomic zone. 1 If successfully carried out, this project would help
North Korea reform its economic base for real cooperation and
prosperity.
12
B. The Special Economic Zones of North Korea in Action
1. The Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone
So far, four SEZs have been established or are under con-
struction in North Korea. The most active working SEZ in North
Korea Korea is the Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade
Zone ("RSFETZ").13 The establishment of the RSFETZ was
8. For details, see Cho Lee-jay, Northeast Asian Economic Development and Tumen River
Basin Development, in THE TUMEN RIVER AREA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF COOPERATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA 279-312 (Lee Seok-jin ed., 1994).
9. See UNDP, A REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR THE TUMEN RIVER AREA AND
NORTHEAST ASIA: NORTHEAST ASIA SUBREGIONAL PROGRAMMES (1994).
10. See RiJong-yol, The River Tumen Triangle, 456 DPRK 29 (1994).
11. See Yang Un-chul, North Korea's Choice for Survival: The RSFETZ Scheme, in THE
TUMEN RIVER AREA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COOPERATION IN
NORTHEAST ASIA, supra note 8, at 17.
12. See KOREA NEWSREVIEW, Jan. 25, 1992, at 16. For details, see LEE supra note 5, at
180-81.
13. The delta area, called the Golden Triangle, covers an area of 746 square kilo-
meters, and borders China and Russia with the Tuman River as the boundary. For
more details, see Ri Jong-Yol, supra note 10, at 28.
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modeled after China's SEZs under the open-door policy.1 4
The RSFETZ is a typical SEZ. The free economic and trade
zone is defined in North Korea as "a certain part of the territory
of the DPRK that is to be treated as a preferential area for transit
transport and trade, processing of exports goods, financing and
services."15 North Korea is trying to develop the RSFETZ into a
tri-functional area that plays as an international transport, trade
and a heavy industry base, as well as a center for finance and
tourism. 6
At the outset, North Korea established legal and institu-
tional frameworks in order to clarify the investment environ-
ment of foreign enterprises in the RSFETZ. For the foreign en-
terprises, North Korea shall provide many preferential treat-
ments, including taxation and customs duty. Here, even the
capitalist market mechanism like price determination has been
partly applied to control the business.
The original master plan for establishing the RSFETZ is di-
vided into three stages. The main objective of the first stage
(1993-1995) was to improve the role of the zone as an interna-
tional cargo transit point by rebuilding and upgrading the ex-
isting infrastructure. In the second stage (1996-2000), North Ko-
rea planned to set up a trade center for Northeast Asia in this
zone. To this end, the infrastructure network established during
the first stage was expected to handle a large volume of interna-
tional transit cargo. The third stage's (2001-2010) goal is to pro-
mote a comprehensive cross-border trade center under the
TRADP. 17 By 2010, consequently, North Korea is expected to
have developed the zone as a center of economic growth in
14. In the early 1980s, the government of the People's Republic of China ("PRC")
first set up five special economic zones ("SEZs") and then opened fourteen additional
cities on the east coast of China for foreign investment. These nineteen special zones
are meant to serve a variety of purposes: attracting foreign investment, importing ad-
vanced technology, keeping with current trends in international markets, expanding
export trade, increasing foreign exchange earnings, and providing a training ground
for scientific and technical personnel. See WORLD TRADE PRESS, CHINA BUSINESS 48
(1994). On the political background of establishing the SEZs of China, see G.T. CRANE,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINA'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES 20-26 (1990).
15. See Law of the DPRK on Free Economic and Trade Zone, art. 2 [hereinafter
LFETZ].
16. See COMMITTEE FOR THE PROMOTION OF EXTERNAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION
("CPEEC") oF THE DPRK, MASTER PLAN FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL ENVIRON-
MENT OF THE RAJIN-SONBONG FREE ECONOMIC AND TRADE ZONE 10 (1994).
17. See Ri Jong-yol, supra note 10.
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Northeast Asia, keeping with its natural and geographical fea-
tures.'
8
TABLE 1: MASTER PLAN FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE RSFETZ
First Stage Second Stage Third Stage
(1993-1995) (1996-2000) (2001-2010)
Goal Improving the role as Establishing a Trade Promoting a compre-
an International Car- Center for Northeast hensive cross-border
go Transit Point. Asia. trade center.
Major Project Construction of nine Handling a large vol- Developing the zone
industrial complexes. ume of international as a center of eco-
transit cargo. nomic growth in
Northeast Asia. 
1 9
For the acceleration of this grand plan, North Korea has so
far adhered to two policy guidelines: it has endeavored to take
practical measures in an attempt to improve the accessibility of
foreign investors to the zone, and it has endeavored to enable
foreign investors to carry out economic activities freely without
internal or external restrictions. As a result, no restriction has
been adopted as to the method of business management and
operation, partly adopting the capitalist market mechanism.
Through freedom of choice, North Korea has tried to create a
flexible business environment.20
2. Shinuiju Special Administrative Region
North Korea promulgated a new law to create a special ad-
ministration region in the city of Shinuiju near its national bor-
der with China. Under the Basic Law of the Shinuiju Special
Administration Region ("the Shinuiju Basic Law"), North Korea
has become "a country with two systems." The Shinuiju Basic
Law covers various fields such as government, economy, State,
people, and culture (as a national constitution usually has) to
manage the independent special administration region. The
Shinuiju Basic Law is composed of six chapters with 106 arti-
cles.21 Article 1 of the Shinuiju Basic Law indicates the legal
18. See CPEEC, RAJIN-SONBONG: INTRODUCTiON TO INVESTMENT (1993). See also
LEE supra note 5, at 183-84.
19. Yong-Joong Lee supra note 5, at 184 (Table VI-1).
20. See Kim Jong-U, Rajin-Sonbong Will Keep Its Door Open to Investors At Any Time,
available at http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/nk-jongu.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
21. The Shinuiju Basic Law has been translated into English by Patricia Goedde.
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES
identity of the Shinuiju Special Administration Region ("SSAR"),
defining the SSAR as "a special administrative unit under the
sovereignty" and the central authority of the DPRK. For the au-
tonomy of the region, the State grants the SSAR independent
legislative, executive and judicial powers at least for fifty years.22
Article 6 of the law prohibits the involvement of the central or-
gan of the DPRK in the home affairs of the SSAR except for
matters of defense: the State is allowed to station military per-
sonnel in the SSAR when necessary.23
The economic principle of the SSAR is fundamentally dif-
ferent from that of other parts of North Korea. It is the free
enterprise system. Based on such a diametrically different eco-
nomic style, the SSAR will be developed into a multilateral SEZ
covering international finance, trade, business, industry, science,
entertainment, and even tourism. 24 To obtain these goals, the
Shinuiju Basic Law provides assurances to potential investors re-
garding the investment climate of the SSAR. These includes a
fifty-year land lease, land use rights, the non-nationalization of
private property, unrestricted movement of foreign currency,
preferential tax and tariff systems, and the convenience of ex-
change of good, capital, information and communication. 25
The Shinuiju Basic Law stipulates the regulations regarding
education, culture, and health in Chapter 3. Article 32 of the
law stipulates the cultural and aesthetic needs for residents of
the region. First, the SSAR authority shall establish a high stan-
dard education system including compulsory eleven-year educa-
tion and public nurseries and kindergartens. 26 The SSAR au-
thority is required to provide modern cultural facilities for liter-
ary and artistic activities.2 7 The authority should also operate a
health insurance system and develop athletic science and tech-
nology by encouraging public athletic activities. 2' The SSAR
For an English version of the Shinuiju Basic Law, see Patricia Goedde, The Basic Law of
the Sinuiju Special Administrative Region: A Happy Medium Between the DPRK Constitution
and Hong Kong Basic Law?, 3J. KOREAN L. 124-37 (2004)
22. See The Shinuiju Basic Law, arts. 2, 3.
23. Id. art. 7.
24. Id. art. 13.
25. Id. arts. 15-17, 23-25, 31. See also Goedde, supra note 21, at 98.
26. Id. arts. 33-34.
27. Id. art. 36.
28. Id. arts. 38-39.
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shall issue regular newspapers, magazines, and broadcasting. 29
Article 42 of the law enumerates the terms of being a resi-
dent in the SSAR. A resident of the SSAR has the same rights
that anyone in a democratic society would have: freedom of ex-
pression, press, assembly, strike/association, and religion.3 0 A
resident also can move freely and travel.3 1 Under the law, a resi-
dent has the right to work and can choose an occupation based
upon his/her desire and ability. 2 With regards to duties, the
Shinuiju Basic Law lays down only two duties: one is to protect
the Nation; the other is to comply with the laws and regulations
enacted by the SSAR authority. 33
The political structure consists of the Legislative Council,
Governor, Administration, Procuracy, and Judiciary. The Legis-
lative Council is the law-making body of the SSAR, and it is com-
posed of fifteen members of the SSAR, citizens or foreigners,
who serve five-year terms. 4 The six specified functions of the
Council are laid down at Article 64 of the law. The Legislative
Council can declare and adopt decisions. However, these deci-
sions are subject to the approval of the Governor and the su-
preme legislative body of the DPRK.35 The Governor, the head
representative of the SSAR, shall be appointed or dismissed by
the supreme legislative body of the DPRK.16 The Governor's ac-
tivities are accountable to the supreme legislative body of the
DPRK.3 v The Administration is the executive body of the
SSAR.38 The Governor heads it and appoints or dismisses its
members. 9 The Administration must determine what depart-
ments should be created for the SSAR.4°
Fifteen functions and powers of the Administration are laid
down at Article 83 of the law. The Procuracy and the judiciary
are separated into different sections in the Shinuiju Basic Law.
29. Id. art. 40.
30. Id. arts. 45-46.
31. Id. art. 49.
32. Id. art. 50.
33. Id. arts. 58-59. For details, see Goedde, supra note 21, at 100.
34. Id. arts. 60-62.
35. Id. arts. 72-74. See also Goedde, supra note 21, at 103.
36. Id. art. 77.
37. Id. art. 76.
38. Id. art. 81.
39. Id. art. 79, 3.
40. See Goedde, supra note 21, at 104.
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The Procuracy is to ensure the compliance with laws as well as to
undertake the investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses
in accordance with the law. The Procuracy helps protect the le-
gal rights, life, and personal assets of juridical persons and indi-
viduals. 41 The SSAR court system is comprised of the regional
court and district court.42 The functions of the SSAR court are
very different in nature from the State court considering that the
SSAR court does not concern itself with protecting the socialist
system and maintaining vigilance against class enemies." The
functions of the court are found at Article 92 of the law. Trial
proceedings in SSAR are generally similar to those of a demo-
cratic society.
C. Kaesung Industrial Complex
A third SEZ in North Korea has been under construction as
an industrial complex in the City of Kaesung, not far from the
Demiliterized Zone. The Kaesung Industrial Complex ("KIC")
plan was announced by North Korea in November 2002 with the
DPRK Law of the Kaesung Industrial Complex ("KICL"). The
primary purpose of constructing the KIC is to induce capital and
technology mainly from South Korea. North Korea hopes to de-
velop the KIC as a complete capitalist-style SEZ.
The management and operation methods of the complex
follow from the KICL. The KICL consists of four chapters with
forty-six articles. The following are the important regulations of
the law. According to Article 1 of the KICL, the KIC is a SEZ
covering such multilateral sectors as industry, trade, commerce,
finance, and tourism. South Koreans, overseas Koreans, foreign
legal persons, and individual and economic organizations may
invest in this complex." Infrastructure development, light in-
dustry, and high-tech sector investment shall be encouraged in
the KIC.4 5 Article 7 of the KICL guarantees the private rights
and profits of investors and prohibits the nationalization of their
estates. The company assigned will play a major role in develop-
ing the complex.4 6 Currently, South Korea's Hyundai Asan Co.
41. See The Shinuiju Basic Law, art. 86.
42. Id.
43. See Goedde, supra note 21, at 107.
44. See DPRK Law of the Kaesung Industrial Complex, art. 2 [hereinafter KICL].
45. Id. art. 4.
46. Id. art. 10.
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has been appointed as a main constructor by the central author-
ity of the KIC. According to Article 21 of the KICL, the manag-
ing organ under the central authority will operate the KIC. The
KICL provides the emigration/immigration regulation for South
Koreans, overseas Koreans, and foreigners and their transporta-
tion, all of whom can come in and out of the complex through
the directed path without visa.4 7 Commercial advertisement will
be free regardless of its location, sort, content, method, and pe-
riod.4
Regarding business activities, the KICL basically lays down
the free enterprise system. In order to establish a business com-
pany, an investor should submit an application to the managing
organ of the KIC. The managing organ should make its decision
and notify it to the applicant within ten days from the receipt of
the application.4 9 The business activities shall be limited within
the scope approved. The change of business sectors will be de-
pendent on the approval of the managing organ of the com-
plex.5 0 A business company would have a bank account in the
KIC. 5 ' The company shall freely take out and bring in the for-
eign currency.5 2 The complex tax will be 14% in general; 10%
will be levied in infrastructure construction, light industry, and
high-tech sectors.5' The dispute concerning the development
and management of the complex and business activities shall be
resolved by the consultant, commercial arbitration, or judicial
procedure.5 4
Since the ground-breaking on June 30, 2003, the KIC has
been under construction. The establishment of the KIC may be
a symbol of North Korea's effort to have more active economic
cooperation with South Korea in spite of the current political
standoff and nuclear crisis.55 In order to successfully obtain the
47. Id. art. 28.
48. Id. art. 31.
49. Id. art. 35.
50. Id. art. 38.
51. Id. art. 42.
52. Id. art. 44.
53. Id. art. 43.
54. Id. art. 46.
55. For details on the North Korean nuclear crisis, see Eric Yong-Joong Lee, Ge-
neva Agreed Framework and the Optimization of DPRK-US Relationship for Nuclear Security: A
Legal and Policy Analysis, 3 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 289-309 (2003).
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purposes of the complex development, North Korea must insti-
tute more progressive economic reformation policies.
D. Mt. Kumgangsan Special Tourist Region
The development plan of Mt. Kumgansan Special Tourist
Region ("KSTR") was announced just ahead of the KIC plan in
November 2002. The KSTR will be another SEZ of North Korea
focusing on international tourism and environmental protec-
tion. For this project, North Korea enacted the DPRK Law of
Mt. Kumgansan Special Tourist Region ("KSTRL"). The KSTRL
provides that North Korea will develop the Mt. Kumgansan area
into a comprehensive tourist complex. A main contractor is also
South Korea's Hyundai Asan Co. The KSTRL adopts the free
investment system. Foreign investors and organizations thus can
invest in any business activities regarding tourism, including ho-
tel, entertainment, or convenience facilities. Investors' estates
will be legally protected in this region. Article 21 of the KSTRL
especially welcomes high-tech/non-air pollution industries like
information technology in this region. This regulation may im-
ply that North Korea has an intention to develop the KSTR into
not only a special tourism but also economic zone.
II. NORTH KOREA'S ECONOMIC REFORMATION THROUGH
THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES
A. North Korea's Legal Initiative for the SEZs
Since proclaiming the establishment of the RSFETZ in late
1991, North Korea, with great concern for the economic refor-
mation through the SEZs, has adopted over forty laws and regu-
lations.56 These laws and regulations have been taking more
concrete shape as the legal regime governing external economic
cooperation in North Korea. They are providing foreign compa-
56. Important ones are as follows: the Law of the DPRK on Free Economic and
Trade Zone, the Law of the DPRK on Foreign Investment, the Law of the DPRK on
Foreign Enterprises, the Law of the DPRK on Equity Joint Venture, the Law of the
DPRK on Contractual Joint Venture, the Law of the DPRK on Foreign-Invested Bank,
the Law of the DPRK on Foreign Exchange Control, the Law of the DPRK on Foreign
Investment-Business Enterprise and Foreign Individual Tax, the Law of the DPRK on
the Leasing of Land, Regulations on Immigration Procedure in the Free Economic and
Trade Zone, and Labor Regulations on Foreign Invested-Enterprise, etc. See CPEEC,
COLLECTION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 1-8 (1996).
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nies with a favorable environment for long term investment.
5 7
The basic legal ground of the SEZs may be found in both
Article 37 of the DPRK Constitution, and Articles 9 and 10 of the
DPRK Law on Foreign Investment. Together with these provi-
sions, North Korea passed the law on Free Economic and Trade
Zone ("LFETZ") in January 1993, which covers direct regula-
tions on the establishment and management of the free trade
and economic zone.5" The LFETZ has been followed by a series
of laws and regulations relating to business in the SEZs.59
1. Article 37 of the Socialist Constitution of DPRK
Article 37 of the 1992 DPRK Constitution presents a rather
progressive regulation for economic reformation. This article
states: "The State shall encourage institutions, enterprises and
organizations in our country to joint ventures and cooperation
of enterprise with foreign corporations and individuals. 60 Arti-
cle 37 aims to provide a legal bridge for establishing active rela-
tions with foreign countries and inducing foreign capital invest-
ment from them. The 1992 DPRK Constitution was amended on
September 5, 1998.61 In accordance with Article 37 of the 1998
Constitution, the regional scope of foreign business activities has
been confined "within a special economic zone."
2. Articles 9 and 10 of the DPRK Law on Foreign Investment
As just mentioned, the basic rules relating to the SEZs shall
be found in the DPRK Law on Foreign Investment ("FIL"). The
FIL, in Articles 9 and 10, provides legal principles on taxes, cus-
toms and other matters for foreign investors. First, Article 9, in
paragraphs 1 and 2, stipulates the special preferential treatment
of tax for foreign enterprises investing in North Korea. Article
10 of the FIL regulates the basic formalities and methods for
foreign-owned enterprises6 2 in the SEZs. Pursuant to Article 10
57. See UNDP, supra note 4, at 39.
58. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
59. On the legal framework of the Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone
(RSFETZ), see LEE supra note 5, at 108-37.
60. See DPRK CONST. art. 37 (1998).
61. See The Socialist Constitution of the DPRK, RODONG SHINMUN, Sept. 6, 1987, at 7.
This newly revised Constitution has been in effect in North Korea since September 5,
1998 when the Tenth SPA endorsed it with unanimous approval.
62. Wholly foreign-owned enterprises are confined to the zone. See DPRK Law on
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of the FIL, North Korea shall make convenient the entry and
exit formalities and methods for foreign investors who travel
with the purpose of setting up or operating business enterprises
in this zone. In sum, the FIL has served for the first legal basis of
both opening the SEZs, and inducing foreign investment to set-
tle there.6"
3. The Law of the DPRK on Free Economic and Trade Zone
The LFETZ 64 is the basic legal instrument of foreign busi-
ness activities in the SEZs. Consisting of seven chapters with
forty-two articles,65 the LFETZ regulates the following: general
management and operation, competence and obligation of an
administrative office, condition of economic activities, tariffs, fi-
nance, dispute settlement, etc. Through the LFETZ, especially,
the capitalist market principle has been partially adopted in the
process of managing foreign business activities in the SEZs.6 6
In accordance with the LFETZ, the free economic and trade
zone is a certain part of the territory of the DPRK, which is to be
treated preferentially for transit transport and trade, processing
of export goods, financing, and services.6" The LFETZ also de-
fines the purpose of establishing the SEZs as "to promote the
external economic cooperation and exchange."68 Under the
LFETZ, foreign investors are permitted to choose any kind of
business management and operation in this zone. 69 The law
protects the capital, incomes, and other rights of the investors.7v
Investments and trade in this zone are to be controlled by
the central trade-guiding organ ("CTGO"), the appropriate cen-
Foreign Investment ("FIL"), art. 3; Law on Foreign Enterprises, art. 1 (1992) (DPRK),
available at http://www.novexcn.com/dprk-foreign-enter_92.html [hereinafter FEL].
63. See LEE, supra note 5, at 188.
64. Having been adopted at the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's As-
sembly on January 31, 1993, the LFETZ was approved at the Fifth Session of the Ninth
Supreme People's Assembly on April 8, 1993, and revised in 1999. See 1 CPEEC, supra
note 56.
65. LFETZ contains the following chapters: 1) General Provisions; 2) Powers and
Duties of the Administrative Organs; 3) Provision of Conditions for Economic Activi-
ties; 4) Customs Duties; 5) Currency and Finance; 6) Guarantees and Privileges; and 7)
Settlement of Disputes. See id.
66. See 1999 revised LFETZ, art. 22, 1.
67. Id. art. 2.
68. Id. art. 1.
69. Id. art. 5.
70. Id. art. 4.
13552004]
1356 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:1343
tral organ, and the zone authority.7' The LFETZ was amended
in 1999. Articles 9 and 12 of the revised LFETZ of 1999 regulate
the powers and duties of the CTGO. The CTGO should reach a
decision of approval or refusal within fifty days of receiving an
application for investment in contractual or equity joint ven-
tures, and within eighty days in the case of wholly foreign-owned
enterprises.72 The appropriate central organ should consult the
budget compilation and implementation, financing, land lease,
urban construction or construction indication. 73 The zone au-
thority consists of the two sub-organs carrying out their duties
concerning foreign investment: the administrative and eco-
nomic department, and the external economic department.74
The LFETZ, by the provisions of Chapter III (Articles 17-
24), confirms free economic activities of foreign investors in the
SEZs. Its basic principle is provided at Article 18 of the LFETZ.
Pursuant to this regulation, foreign investors may invest, estab-
lish, and operate an enterprise in these zones. For it, investors
are entitled to carry out all business activities including free ship-
ping, storing, processing, assembly and disassembly, packing and
repairing of all goods. 75 Article 22 of the law states that price in
the SEZs may be determined by agreement between buyer and
seller in an objective and fair way on the basis of a scientific as-
sessment of value and accurate consideration of the relationship
between demand and supply.7
6
In Article 25, North Korea aims to establish a system of pref-
erential customs duties for foreign enterprises investing in the
SEZs. 7 7 The currency in circulation in this zone is North Korean
won or a convertible foreign currency. The foreign currency ex-
change rate against North Korean won shall be controlled by the
foreign exchange control organization.78
71. Id. art. 8.
72. Id. art. 13.
73. Id. art. 10.
74. Id. art. 11. See LEE supra note 5, at 191-92.
75. 1999 revised LFETZ, art. 17, 1 1.
76. Id. art. 7.
77. The preferential customs duties are applied to the materials on goods that are
imported into the zone. See Customs Regulations for the Free Economic and Trade
Zone, art. 38.
78. See 1999 revised LFETZ, art. 30. The Foreign Trade Bank of DPRK is special-
ized for foreign exchange transaction. See Law of the DPRK on Foreign Exchange Con-
trol, art. 5.
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Moreover, the LFETZ guarantees all the rights and profits
of foreign investors who have invested in the SEZs. 79 When the
duration of operation expires, according to Article 35 of the law,
a foreign investor may remit profits earned abroad from business
activities in the SEZs and other incomes.
The foreign enterprise investing in the SEZs pays just a
14%80 income tax of profits earned,8' and the income tax would
be reduced up to 50% if the enterprise reinvests its profits within
five years.82
With regard to the method of dispute settlement, Article 42
of the law refers to consultation between the parties concerned.
In some cases, however, disputes may be brought to the court or
arbitration body of the DPRK, or to arbitration in a third coun-
try.8
3
B. General Principles of the FIL
The FIL was adopted to encourage investment by foreign
investors based on the principles of complete equality and mu-
tual benefit in the territory of North Korea.8 4 Article 2 of the
FIL refers to the guidelines for the forms and management of
foreign joint ventures established in the SEZs of North Korea, as
well as the status of foreign investors there.8" In particular, Arti-
cle 2, paragraph 3 of the FIL provides three forms of foreign
investment:86 equity joint venture enterprises, 87 contractual
79. On rights and profits of investors, see Customs Regulations in the Free Eco-
nomic and Trade Zone, arts. 41-53.
80. Foreign enterprises investing in other parts of North Korea should pay 25%
income tax. See Law of the DPRK on Taxes on Foreign-invested Enterprise and For-
eigners, art. 12 [hereinafter TFIEL].
81. See 1999 revised LFETZ, art. 36; FIL, art. 9. In the SEZs of the People's Repub-
lic of China ("PRC"), the manufacturing companies should pay a 15% income tax. For
details on the income tax in China's SEZs, seeJ.G.S. Yang & H. An, Tax Incentives ofJoint
Ventures in China, 24 INr'L TAXJ. 69-88 (1998).
82. See 1999 revised LFETZ, art. 40, 1. For details, see TFIEL, arts. 8-16.
83. See 1999 revised LFETZ, art. 42. For details, see LEE supra note 5, at 189-93.
84. See FIL, art. 1. Article 1, paragraph 2 of the FIL outlines the basic policies of
North Korea, stating that: "The State encourages foreign investors to invest in the terri-
tory of the DPRK on the principle of complete equality and mutual benefit." Id.
85. Id. art. 2.
86. Id. art. 2, 3. Article 2, paragraph 3 of the FIL states that: "A foreign-invested
enterprise is a contractual or equityjoint venture enterprise or a wholly foreign-owned
enterprise that is set up in the territory of the DPRK." Id. art. 2, 3.
87. Id. art. 2, 5.
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joint venture enterprises,8" and wholly foreign-owned subsidiar-
ies.89
Under the FIL, the status of a foreign investor is given to a
corporate body or an individual from a foreign country that in-
vests in the territory of North Korea.9 ° Their legal rights and
interests are guaranteed by the State.9 1 In addition, the legal
profits and other revenues earned by business activities may be
repatriated or remitted abroad according to the laws and regula-
tions of North Korea on foreign exchange control.92
Article 5, paragraph 1 of the FIL permits institutions, com-
panies, enterprises and other economic bodies of foreign coun-
tries to invest within the territory of North Korea. Foreign in-
vestment enterprises may open branch offices, representative of-
fices or agencies in North Korea or outside the country. 93
The business areas available for foreign investment consist
of industry and financial services. Foreign-invested enterprises
that operate in sectors such as high-tech, natural resources, in-
ternational trade, or infrastructure will be given preferential
treatment by the State in taxation, land use, and bank loans. In
addition to investment sector-preferences, Article 9 of the FIL
provides for special region-preference to those foreign enter-
prises that operate in the SEZs.94 Article 11 of the FIL clarifies
the investment projects that are prohibited and restricted.95
The FIL governs practical business matters such as taxation,
real property leases, and labor management. In relation to taxa-
tion, Article 17 of the FIL provides that foreign investors are sub-
ject to income, business, property, and other taxes according to
North Korean law.96 Article 15 of the FIL allows foreign inves-
tors to lease land necessary for their enterprises for a maximum
period of fifty years. According to Article 16, paragraph 1, for-
88. Id. art. 2, 4.
89. Id. art. 2, 6.
90. Id. art. 2, 2.
91. Id. art. 3.
92. Id. art. 20. See LEE supra note 5, at 115.
93. FIL, supra note 62, art. 13. However, branch or representative offices set up in
North Korea will not have a legal personality under North Korean law. Id. art. 14.
94. On preferential treatment, see id. arts. 9-10.
95. Article 11 restricts projects that may hinder the development of the national
economy, threaten national security, or that may be technically obsolete and harmful to
the environment. Id. art. 11.
96. Id. art. 17.
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eign-funded enterprises must employ North Korean labor forces
according to the recommendation of the relevant labor service
agency.97 It is permitted, however, to bring in special human
resources, such as management personnel, technicians, or
skilled workers under agreement with the External Economic
Committee of the Cabinet ("EXEC")."s Profits and other in-
come earned by foreign investors in their business activities may
be either reinvested or remitted abroad pursuant to Articles 18
and 20 of the FIL.99
The FIL was revised on February 26, 1999, along with eight
other laws relating to foreign business.' 00 The revision was ap-
parently aimed at making adjustments in connection with the
amendment of the Constitution in 1998. An explicit change in
the FIL was the introduction of the term "foreign enterprise" as
a new form of foreign investment in North Korea.' 0 1 A foreign
enterprise in this law may mean a foreign organ or an enter-
prise, individual, or economic organization that derives income
in the territory of North Korea. 10 2 This foreign enterprise is re-
garded as an independent bodies corporate [sic]. ° The new
FIL adds a regulation to guarantee the condition of business ac-
tivities for foreign invested enterprises.10 4
97. Id. art. 16.
98. The External Economic Organ of the Administration Council has been
changed into the External Economic Committee of the Cabinet ("EXEC") under the
Socialist Constitution of 1998. See 1998 DPRK Constitution, supra note 60, art. 117.
99. On the general principles of the FIL, see A. Wohlgemuth, The Law on Foreign
Investment in North Korea, I INr'L Bus. L.J. 48-52 (1993). See also LEE supra note 5, at
116.
100. The following revisions of the laws on foreign business cooperation were
adopted by the Decision 484 of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's As-
sembly on February 26, 1999: 1) Law on Free Economic and Trade Zone; 2) The For-
eign Investment Law; 3) The Foreign Enterprise Law; 4) The Contractual Joint Venture
Law; 5) Law on Foreign-invested Enterprises and Foreigners' Tax; 6) The Law on For-
eign Exchange Control; 7) The Land Lease Law; 8) Law on Foreign-invested Bank; and
9) The Equity Joint Venture Law. See Chin Gil Sang, DPRK Revises 9 Foreign Investment
Laws, PEOPLE'S KOREA, Sept. 25, 1999, at 1, 8.
101. See 1999 Revised FIL, art. 2
102. Id. Difference between the foreign enterprises and the foreign subsidiaries
will be shown at Table 3.
103. Id. art. 14.
104. Id. art. 4. See LEE supra note 5, at 116-17.
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C. Laws Governing the Three Forms of Foreign Investment
under the FIL
Since the promulgation of FIL, North Korea has adopted a
series of laws and regulations relating to foreign investment.
They are the legal underpinnings for North Korea's economic
reformation. Between 1992 and 1994, particularly, North Korea
developed specific laws for the three forms of investment al-
lowed under Article 2, paragraph 3 of the FIL. These include
the Law of the DPRK on Equity Joint Venture, the Law of the
DPRK on the Contractual Joint Ventures, and the Law of the
DPRK on Foreign Enterprises, each of which are examined in
the following sections.
TABLE 2: THE THREE FORMS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN
NORTH KOREA UNDER THE FIL10 5
Contractual Joint
Equity Joint Venture Venture Foreign Subsidiaries
Registered Capital 50:50 According to the Wholly foreign-
Ratio contract between the owned entities are
host and the foreign allowed.
partner.
Preferred Sector High tech, infra- Exportable goods, Electronics, automa-
structure develop- using advanced tech- ion, machine-build-
ment, scientific re- nology, tourism and ing, food-processing,
search or interna- service, clothing, daily-neces-
tionally competitive sities, etc.
product.
Allowed Region Mainly in Rajin- Anywhere in North Only in Rajin-
Sonbong area. If Korea Sonbong FETZ
necessary, other re-
gions in North Ko-
rea
The Law of the DPRK on EquityJoint Venture ("EJVL"), 10 6
promulgated in 1994, governs the rights and obligations for es-
tablishing and managing joint ventures in the territory of North
Korea. A purpose of EJVL is "to contribute to expanding and
developing economic and technical cooperation and exchange
between the DPRK and other foreign countries." 10 7 The 1994
EJVL has detailed and feasible regulations on the management
105. See LEE, supra note 5, at 118 (Table IV-4).
106. Law of the DPRK on Equity Joint Venture (adopted on Jan. 20, 1994 and
revised on Feb. 26, 1999) [hereinafter EJVL].
107. Id. art. 1.
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of an equity joint venture ("EJV") enterprise.108
In order to establish and operate an EJV, a joint venture
contract should be made between an institution, enterprise, or
association of North Korea, and a corporate body or individual
of a foreign country doing business in the territory of North Ko-
rea.1 °9 An EJV under this law may be established to do business
in the science and technology, industry, construction, and trans-
portation sectors. Projects involving high-tech, internationally
competitive products, infrastructure development, or scientific
research and technological development are especially en-
couraged by the State."10 Article 6, paragraph 2 of the EJVL en-
sures the protection of the legal rights and interests of the EJV
enterprise."' In order to establish an EJV, the parties must sub-
mit an application to the authorities for approval after making
the EJV contract.1 2 Once the application has been received, the
authorities must decide whether to approve or to refuse the ap-
plication within fifty days." 3
With regard to capital investment, Article 15 of the EJVL
requires that the "registered capital" of an EJV must be between
30% - 70%114 of the total amount of capital required. Capital
may be contributed to the EJV in the form of cash, property in
kind, industrial property rights, technical know-how, land rights,
or in other forms.' 1 5
The top decision making body of an EJV enterprise is the
board of directors, which is responsible for deciding major issues
concerning the enterprise. 16 For carrying out its business activi-
ties, pursuant to Article 22 of the EJVL, an EJV enterprise should
obtain a business license issued by the appropriate authority. An
EJV's business activities are confined to the types of business in
108. See Eric Yong-Joong Lee, Development of North Korea's Legal Regime Governing
Foreign Business Cooperation: A Revisit under the New Socialist Constitution of 1998, 21 NW.J.
OF INT'L L. & Bus. 216-17 (2000)
109. See EJVL, art. 2. For the original text, see Equity Joint Venture Law on Joint
Venture, PEOPLE'S KoREA, Feb. 12, 1994, at 4-8.
110. See EJVL, supra note 106, art. 3.
111. Article 6, paragraph 2 of the EJVL states that "[t]he State shall protect the
legal rights and interests of equity joint venture enterprises." Id. art. 6, 1 2.
112. Id. art. 9, 1.
113. Id. art. 9, 2.
114. Id. art. 15.
115. Id. art. 11, 2.
116. Id. arts. 16-17.
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which it has been specifically allowed to engage.' 17 In relation to
managing and using labor forces, Article 27 of the EJVL provides
that an EJV enterprise should be in compliance with labor law
and regulations regarding foreign-invested businesses in North
Korea.
18
The mechanisms of accounting and profit distribution are
set out in Articles 34 and 37 of the EJVL. An EJV enterprise
must determine its annual profit by subtracting costs from the
gross revenue in each year.' 19 The remaining amount of profit
should be distributed to the joint venture partners according to
the proportion of their subscriptions. 121
If an EJV enterprise is unable to continue operations for
some reason,12 ' Article 43 of the EJVL allows the board of direc-
tors to dissolve the EJV enterprise before the termination period
set by the contract. It may also dissolve itself either with the per-
mission of the body that approved its establishment, or by court
decision. 1
2 2
The EJVL was amended on February 26, 1999. The 1999
revised EJVL reflects the factual needs and the practical perspec-
tive of North Korea's economic reformation. The revised EJVL
may be applicable outside the territory of the DPRK 12 3 Under
the new EJVL, a partner's share can be transferred or inherited
with the consent of the opposite party and through the discus-
sion at the board of directors. 124 An EJV is permitted to com-
bine with other foreign enterprises. 125
2. The Law of the DPRK on the Contractual Joint Venture
The Law of the DPRK on Contractual Joint Ventures
("CJVL") of 1992126 governs the rights and obligations of con-
117. Id. art. 25, 1.
118. Id. art. 27. An example of such labor laws is the Labor Regulations for For-
eign Enterprises (1993).
119. See EJVL, supra note 106, art. 33.
120. See id. art. 37, 2.
121. For example, termination of contracted time, insolvency, contractual default
by either any partner, or natural calamities. Id. art. 43.
122. Id. art. 44, 1.
123. See 1999 revised EJVL, art. 2.
124. Id. art. 12.
125. Id. art. 13. For details on EJVL, see Lee supra note 108, at 216-20
126. The Law of the DPRK on Contractual Joint Venture (adopted on Oct. 5, 1992
and revised on Feb. 26, 1999) [hereinafter CJVL].
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cerned parties for establishing and managing a contractual joint
venture ("CJV"). A purpose of the CJVL is "to contribute to the
expansion of economic cooperation and technical exchange be-
tween North Korea and the rest of the world." '2 7 Under the
CJVL, a CJV means a business activity:
in which investors from the DPRK and from foreign a country
invest jointly, with production and management being as-
sumed by the host partner, and the portion of the investment
made by the foreign partner is redeemed or the portion of
profit to which the foreign partner is entitled is allotted in
accordance with the provisions of the joint venture con-
tract. 
128
North Korea prefers to establish CJVs primarily in sectors
producing exportable goods using advanced technology, as well
as in the tourism and service sectors. 129 To establish a CJV, Arti-
cle 6 of the CJVL requires the enterprises to (1) consult with
their governing bodies; (2) execute ajoint venture contract; and
(3) submit an application to the EXEC.' The EXEC must de-
cide whether to approve or reject the application within fifty
days after its submission.1 31
A CJV should pursue the business activities specified in the
application at the time of approval. In order to draw a wider
range of investors, the CJVL provides for the possibility of a third
party's participation with the permission of the EXEC.'1 2
Article 11 of the CJVL permits the foreign partner of a CJV
to employ technicians from its own country or a third country by
contract.' In addition, a CJV contract may specify the govern-
ance procedures of the business, including the establishment of
a non-permanent body for joint consultation in key decision-
making. 13 4
The accounts of a CJV may be settled on a monthly, quar-
127. Id. art. 1.
128. Id. art. 2.
129. Id. art. 3.
130. Id. art. 6, 1-2.
131. Id. art. 7.
132. Id. art. 10.
133. Id. art. 11.
134. Id. art. 16, 1 1. The non-permanent body for joint consultation could ex-
amine such matters concerning the operation of the venture, the introduction of new
technology, the improvement of quality, or reinvestment. Id. art. 16, 2.
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terly, or yearly basis.135 After the accounts have been settled, any
profits or other revenue "earned by the foreign investor may be
remitted abroad subject to the laws and regulations of North Ko-
rea on foreign currency control."136 A CJV enterprise must pay
tax as prescribed by the relevant law of the DPRK. 13 7
A CJV may be dissolved when the period of its contract ex-
pires. 138 If any of the CJV partners fails to fulfill its duties as
stipulated in the contract, the enterprise may be terminated
before the expiration of the contract.1 39
The CJVL received some alterations on February 26, 1999.
According to Article 5 of the revised CJVL, "the regional scope
of establishing a CJV could be expanded outside the territory of
the DPRK." 14 ° In addition, Article 8 of the revised CJVL provides
for the tax registration of a CJV.'41
3. The Law of the DPRK on Foreign Enterprises
The FEL'4 2 provides the basic rules for the creation of
wholly foreign-owned entities ("foreign subsidiaries") in the
SEZs.14 3 Article 2 of the FEL defines a foreign subsidiary as "an
enterprise which a foreign investor establishes by investing the
whole amount of capital needed for founding and running it
independently." '44 The revised FEL of 1999 introduces a new
term, "foreign enterprise."14 5 Compared to foreign subsidiaries,
a foreign enterprise is generally defined as "an institute, enter-
prise, individual, or other economic body from foreign countries
with a proper source of income in the territory of DPRK' 4 6
North Korea's definition of a foreign enterprise, however, is a bit
different from the generally recognized one. In North Korea, a
135. Id. art. 17.
136. Id. art. 15.
137. Id.
138. Id. art. 20.
139. Id. art. 19.
140. 1999 Revised CJVL, art. 5.
141. Id. art. 8. For details on CJVL, see Lee, supra note 108, at 220-22.
142. FIL, supra note 62.
143. Id. art. 1.
144. Id. art. 2.
145. 1999 Revised FEL [hereinafter Revised FEL]. The revised FEL states that "[a]
foreign invested enterprise is a contractual or equity joint venture enterprise, or a
wholly foreign-owned enterprise that is set up in the territory of the DPRK." Id. art. 2,
3.
146. Id. art. 2.
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foreign enterprise is a business entity that is established in accor-
dance with the law of a foreign country and manages its business
activities with approval by a host country. Foreign enterprises
maintain their own nationalities even within North Korea. Thus,
their home countries retain jurisdiction over their personnel,
while North Korea has territorial jurisdiction.14 The sectors in
which foreign subsidiaries are permitted to operate are listed in
Article 3 of the FEL. 148
TABLE 3: COMPARISON OF FOREIGN SUBSIDIARY WITH
FOREIGN ENTERPRISE 49
Foreign Subsidiary Foreign Enterprise
Definition An enterprise which a foreign inves- An institute, enterprise, individual,
tor establishes by investing the or other economic bodies from for-
whole amount of capital needed for eign countries with a proper source
founding and running it indepen- of income in the territory of DPRK.
dently.
Legal Basis Laws of DPRK. Law of investing countries.
Jurisdiction Capital importing country. Capital investing country.
In order to set up an enterprise under the FEL, a foreign
investor must submit an application to the EXEC.15 0  If ap-
proved, the foreign investor must register the enterprise at the
administrative and economic committee of the appropriate prov-
ince within thirty days.' The foreign enterprise's investment
must be made within the period stated in the approved applica-
tion.152
Article 14 of the FEL provides the relevant guidelines for
the business activities of foreign enterprises. According to this
provision, foreign subsidiaries must carry out their business activ-
ities according to the charter and by-laws of enterprise manage-
ment. A foreign investor should submit its plan of future busi-
147. See Chin Gil Sang, Difference between Foreign-owned Enterprise and Foreign Enter-
prise, The People's Korea, at http://210.145.168.243/pk/main.htm (last visited Apr. 9,
2004).
148. Important sectors in which foreign subsidiaries are permitted are: 1) elec-
tronics, automation, machine, tool, and power industries; 2) food processing, garment,
and everyday consumer goods; 3) building materials, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals;
and 4) construction, transportation, service sectors, and others deemed necessary. See
FEL, supra note 62, art. 3.
149. Lee, supra note 108, at 224 (Table 111-7). See also Chin, supra note 147.
150. See FEL, supra note 62, art. 7.
151. Id. art. 9:
152. Id. arts. 12-13.
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ness activities to the provincial administrative and economic
committee where it has been registered. It may obtain the
materials it needs either in North Korea or abroad.153 For better
foreign currency circulation, the FEL allows a foreign subsidiary
to open an account at the trade bank or other banks in North
Korea, or abroad. 154
An employment contract may be concluded with the labor
service agency in the area of a foreign enterprise's operation.
Generally, local workers may be employed by foreign enterprises
with approval from the EXEC. Foreign enterprises may bring in
technicians and skilled foreign workers. 155 Employees may form
a trade union and demand insurance. 156
Taxes are paid as stipulated in the relevant law of the DPRK.
No customs duty may be levied either on materials related to the
production and management activities of a foreign enterprise,
or on products that it exports.1 57
When the approved period of its operation expires, the for-
eign enterprise is dissolved.' 58 In the case of dissolution, legal
profits from a foreign enterprise's business activities may be ei-
ther reinvested or remitted abroad according to the relevant
laws and regulations of North Korea. 159
The FEL was revised on February 26, 1999. In Article 1, the
revised FEL provides the primary purpose of the law more
clearly. 60 Article 7 of the revised FEL requires a foreign investor
who wishes to establish an enterprise in the DPRK to consult
with relevant organs. 6' The revised FEL permits joint opera-
tions only between the enterprises from foreign countries. 162
Together, endorsement regulation for expanding or changing
the business activities has been laid down in Article 14 of the
153. Id. arts. 15-16.
154. Id. art. 18.
155. Id. art. 20. To do this, foreign enterprises must reach an agreement with the
external economic organ of the Administrative Council. Id.
156. Id. arts. 21, 23.
157. Id. art. 25.
158. Id. art. 28, 1.
159. Id. art. 22.
160. See 1999 Revised FEL, supra note 145, art. 1. Article 1 states: "[tihe Law of
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Foreign Enterprises makes a contribu-
tion to establish and run foreign enterprises in the Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and
Trade Zone and to expand and develop economic relations with other countries." Id.
161. Id. art. 7.
162. Id. art. 10.
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revised FEL. 16 3
III. PROTECTION AGAINST POLITICAL RISKS INVESTING IN
THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES
A. Political Risks in International Economic Relations
One of the greatest concerns to participants in foreign in-
vestment is the loss of their investment and acquired interests
due to political risks in the host country. A political risk in inter-
national economic relations may be defined as the "risk faced by
a foreign government or an investor that a host country will con-
fiscate all or a portion of the investor's property rights located in
the host country." 64
The origins of such political risks may be divided into some
typical forms. The first form of political risk is ideological hostil-
ity. Despite the end of the Cold War, ideological hostility may
still be a critical risk in foreign investment. For example, a (for-
mer) socialist political regime may be far from the private con-
trol of certain areas of industry. In such countries, capital invest-
ment would be sometimes regarded as capital infiltration, which
might threaten to the maintenance of their political regime.
The second form of political risk is nationalism. When the host
economy is in decline, prosperous foreign investors who seem to
control the economy and repatriate profits may become easy tar-
get of xenophobic nationalism. 65 Today's economic national-
ism stems from various factors such as religion, 66 neo-liberalistic
multinational corporations, t 67 or previous history between the
relevant States. Another form of political risk may be a funda-
mental change of domestic political regime in the host State in-
cluding revolution, terrorism, civil strife, or a military coup.1 68
In such a case, the incoming government might claim a right to
163. Id. art. 14. For details on FEL, see Lee, supra note 108, at 223-25.
164. PAUL E. ComFAux & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 1 (1997). On the political risks in foreign investment, see,
e.g., S. Linn Williams, Political and Other Risk Insurance: OPIC, MIGA, Eximbank and Other
Providers, 5 PACE INT'L L. REV. 59 (1993).
165. Id. at 58.
166. See GEORGE H. ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 2-5 (1996).
167. Much of the debate on the business activities of multinational corporations as
a threat to State sovereignty began in Europe in the 1960s. For details, see generally
JEAN-JACQUES SERVAN-SCHREIBER, THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE (1969).
168. See COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 164, at 16.
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rescind any contracts made by the previous government, because
the new government has an absolutely different ideology or po-
litical system. No noticeable cases, however, have been reported
recently that a host country has abrogated an intergovernmental
contract just for fundamental changes of domestic political re-
gime. Moreover, the continuation of international treaties be-
tween successive political regimes is often supported by the the-
ory of State succession under international law.' 6 9
Today, a few types of political risks may be found in actual
foreign investment. The first form of political risk is expropria-
tion. 70  Expropriation refers to the taking by a host state of
property owned by an investor and located in the host State, os-
tensibly for a public purpose.' 7 ' The second type of political risk
is de facto expropriation,1 72 which refers to depriving the inves-
tors of the use and effective ownership of its assets, even though
the investor may retain nominal ownership. The third type of
political risk is currency risk. In this case, the host country either
prohibits the investor from converting local currency into hard
currency, or increases controls over the exchange of currency.173
169. See LEE, supra note 5, at 154-57. On the legal principle of State succession, see
MUDIMURANWA A. B. MUTITI, STATE SUCCESSION TO TREATIES IN RESPECT OF NEWLY INDE-
PENDENT AFRICAN STATES (1976). See also LUNG-FONG CHEN, STATE SUCCESSION RELATING
TO UNEQUAL TREATIES (1974).
170. On the international legal aspects of expropriation, see SAMY FRIEDMAN, Ex-
PROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1953); BEN ATKINSON WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1959); HAis W. BAADE ET AL., ESSAYS ON EXPROPRIATIONS
(Richard S. Miller & RolandJ. Stanger eds., 1967); MICHAEL BOGDAN, EXPROPRIATION IN
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1975).
171. See COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 164, at 3. Expropriation is considered
legitimate under international law only if it meets the following conditions: (1) nondis-
criminatory; (2) done for a public purpose; and (3) accompanied by full compensation.
Id. at 77-85. The meaning of expropriation is often used interchangeably with national-
ization or confiscation. For details on the distinction between expropriation and na-
tionalization, see WORTLEY, supra note 170, at 93. See also RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE
STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 98 (1995).
172. It is often referred to as "creeping" expropriation or "indirect" expropriation.
See Robert B. Shanks, Insuring Investment and Loans Against Currency Inconvertibility, Expro-
priation, and Political Violence, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 417, 417-24 (1986).
173. In the sense that a State's prohibition of converting local currency into hard
currency has expropriated the assets of the investors, currency risk is a new type of
political risk. See LEE, supra note 5, at 157-59.
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B. International Legal Principles Governing Protection against
Political Risks
1. Pacta Sunt Servanda
One of the fundamental principles shaping international
law against political risk is pacta sunt servanda. 74 This well-estab-
lished legal principle will bind the States under an international
contract and lead them to exercise the promise made in the con-
tract. A modern transformation of the pacta sunt servanda princi-
ple is the stabilization clause of State contracts. The main pur-
pose of this clause is to segregate international contracts from
changes in the law of the State party. By means of the stabiliza-
tion, investors could prevent the host State from changing its
laws to their detriment. 175 Pacta sunt servanda has been also sub-
stantiated by the judgment of the arbitration court. In the case
of Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. & California Asiatic Oil
Co.("TOPCO") vs. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic,
the arbitrator Dupuy confirmed this principle stating that:
"[t]his Tribunal cannot but reaffirm this in its turn by stating
that the maxim pacta sunt servanda should be viewed as a funda-
mental principle of international law."' 17
6
2. State Responsibility
State responsibility in international law1 7 7 can be invoked as
a legal ground for protecting foreign investment against political
risks. It generally concerns the accountability of States in viola-
tion of international law and requires States to make reparation
for such violations.17 8 State responsibility may be invoked when
174. The principle of pacta sunt servanda has been codified at the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (opened for signature on May 23, 1969, entered
into force Jan. 27, 1980). The Vienna Convention of 1969 provides that: "[e]very treaty
in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith." Id. art. 26. Moreover, the Preamble to the Vienna Convention of 1969 notes
that "the principles of free consent and of good faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule
are universally recognized." Id. at pmbl. See Manfred Lachs, Pacta Sunt Servada, in 7
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 364, 364-71 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1984).
175. See TRANSMITTAL & INSTRUCTION SHEET FOR TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS 34
(Charles Stewart ed., 1999).
176. 17 I.L.M. 1, 19 (1978). See also LEE supra note 5, at 159-60.
177. SeeJames Crawford, Second Report on State Responsibility, U.N. GAOR 51st Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/498 (1999). On the principle of State responsibility, see UNITED
NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY (Marina Spinedi & Bruno Simma eds.,
1987). See also IAN BROWNLIE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY (1983).
178. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How
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a breach of obligation in a treaty is committed by a State. 179 In
the case concerning the Rainbow Warrior arbitration, the tribu-
nal stated: "[t]he legal consequences of a breach of treaty are
subjects that belong to the customary of State responsibility."'180
With regard to international contracts, the principle of State re-
sponsibility may be also called upon as a guideline to guarantee
the contract between the parties concerned.' 81
3. Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity is a doctrine that prohibits a State from
exercising jurisdiction over another State, agents, or instrumen-
talities. 1 82 Before the twentieth century, this doctrine was so ab-
solute that a State should not subject another State to its jurisdic-
tion.18 As States became increasingly involved in international
activities, the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity began to
be questioned. 84 In 1945, the United States first recognized the
doctrine of "restrictive" sovereign immunity, stating that immu-
nity would be recognized concerning sovereign and public acts
of State, but not with respect to private acts.1 8 5 This recognition
WE USE IT 146-68 (1994). On the accountability of States in international law, Judge
Huber emphasized in the Spanish Zone of Morocco case that: "[r]esponsibility is the
necessary corollary of a right. All rights of an international character involve interna-
tional responsibility. Responsibility results in the duty to make reparation if the obliga-
tion in the question is not met." See 2 Reports of International Arbitral Awards 615,
U.N. (1924).
179. A breach of a treaty, at any rate if it is substantial, constitutes an international
wrong and cannot simply be linked to a breach of contract. See F. A. Mann, The Conse-
quence of an International Wrong in International and National Law, BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1
(1977).
180. See 82 I.L.R. 519 (1990).
181. See COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 164, at 32-35. See also LEE, supra note 5,
at 160-61.
182. See COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 164, at 45. See also GAMAL MoURsi BADR,
STATE IMMUNITY-. AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW 9-19 (1984).
183. Concerning the absolute sovereignty immunity, Judge Higgins has stated:
"[u]nder classical international law, [S] tates were granted immunity from the territorial
jurisdiction of other [S) rates. Various reasons of policy have been suggested, all interre-
lated." See HIGGINS, supra note 178, at 78-79.
184. According to Judge Higgins: "[a]s [S]tates began to engage in functions not
wholly reserved to the [S]tates, absolute immunity increasingly seemed an inappropri-
ate phenomenon in the face of the requirements of the contemporary commercial
world and of notions of stability, fairness, and equity in the market place." Id. at 79.
185. A more traditional theory restricting the absolute sovereign immunity of the
foreign investor may be found in the Calvo clause maintained by Latin American gov-
ernments, under which the alien agrees not to seek the diplomatic protection of his or
her own State and submits matters arising from the contract to the local jurisdiction.
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was codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
("FSIA").6 Following the new trend of restrictive sovereign im-
munity, foreign investors could protect their rights over the capi-
tal invested in the host country more efficiently by submitting
disputes to the jurisdiction they want.1 87
C. Legal Methods for Protecting against Political Risks in
Foreign Investment
1. Standard Contract Model: BIT
In order to minimize political risks in international eco-
nomic relations, investors, first of all, should inform themselves
of the protection regulations of the host State governing poten-
tial political risks when making an international contract. To
this end, parties concerned should make a contract following a
recognized contract model. One of the internationally estab-
lished contract models is the Bilateral Investment Treaty
("BIT").188 The BIT is an agreement concluded between two
States in which each State agrees to offer certain protections to
investors and foreign direct investment from the other State.1 89
To provide a more detailed illustration of a typical BIT, in 1982,
the United States announced the formulation of a new Model
BIT including provisions that affect political risks in interna-
tional economic transactions. 190
2. Insurance
In addition to the standard contract model internationally
established, foreign investors can purchase insurance for reduc-
See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 546 (4th ed. 1990). On
the juridicial review of the Calvo clause, see DONALD R. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE: A
PROBLEM OF INTER-AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY (1955).
186. On the FSIA of the United States, see COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 164,
at 48-54.
187. See U.S. Model Bilateal Investment Treaty, art. IX.
188. See EAST-WEsT ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN THE CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT:
PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE HELD BY THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION IN
BUDAPEST, HUNGARY, AND VIENNA, AUSTRIA 99 (Bela Csikos Nagy & David G. Young eds.,
1986).
189. For details, see DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 171, at 1946. See also Antonio
R. Parra, Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment, 12 ICSID REv. 287, 288
(1997).
190. The US Model BIT was updated in 1983, 1984, 1987, and 1994. See LEE, supra
note 5, at 162-63.
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ing political risks to their investment. With insurance, the inves-
tors may be compensated for the losses arising from political
risks. Two renowned investment insurance companies are the
United States' Overseas Private Investment Corporation
("OPIC") and the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guaran-
tee Agency ("MIGA"). 91
D. North Korea's Legal Instruments for Protecting Foreign Investment
in the Special Economic Zones
1. General
Regarding the protection of political risks, in principle,
North Korea is trying to guarantee the legal rights and interests
of foreign investors and foreign-funded enterprises with laws and
regulations for protecting their investment.
A basic principle for protecting the legal rights of foreign
investors against political risks in North Korea is provided by the
FIL. Article 4 of the FIL first provides the guidelines for protec-
tion against the political risks, proclaiming that: "[t]he State,
subject to the laws of the DPRK, shall guarantee the legal rights
and interests of foreign investors and foreign-invested enter-
prise." 192 With regard to the nationalization of foreign invest-
ment, Article 19 of the FIL provides strict legal conditions. 93
According to this provision, foreign-funded enterprises and as-
sets invested by foreign investors may be nationalized or confis-
cated only when an inevitable situation requires it. 19 4 This also
lays down that full compensation shall be paid even in these cir-
cumstances. Article 20 of the FIL guarantees the legal profits
and revenue earned by foreign investors in their business activi-
ties and the repatriation or remittance of moneys remaining af-
ter the liquidation of investment according to the relevant laws
and regulations.1" 5 Article 21 of the FIL stipulates the regula-
191. Id. at 163-64.
192. FIL, supra note 62, art. 4.
193. It states: "[f] oreign-invested enterprises, and assets invested by foreign inves-
tors, shall not be subject to nationalization or seizure by the State. Should unavoidable
circumstances make it necessary to nationalize or seize such enterprise or assets, fair
compensation shall be paid." Id. art. 4.
194. See Wohlgemuth, supra note 99, at 50.
195. See e.g., The Law of the DPRK on Foreign Exchange Control (1994) [herein-
after FECL]; Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the DPRK on Foreign
Exchange Control.
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tions for protecting the managerial secrets of foreign-invested
enterprises.' 96 Concerning capital investment, Article 12 of the
FIL provides for the protection of property rights of foreign in-
vestors. According to the article: "[t]he value of properties and
property rights invested should be assessed jointly on the basis of
international market prices prevailing at the time of evalua-
tion."'1 9
7
In the case of carrying out a joint venture business, Article
6198 of the EJVL stipulates State protection for both invested
properties and the income of foreign partners in North Ko-
rea.'9 9 Article 12 of the EJVL allows a joint venture partner to
transfer his or her share to an heir or a third party. In the
meantime, protecting foreign currency convertibility is laid
down in Article 9 of the Law of the DPRK on Foreign Exchange
Control ("FECL") .200 Article 7 of the KICL prohibits the nation-
alization of investors' estate and guarantees their rights and prof-
its. Neither South/overseas Koreans nor foreigners shall be con-
fined, arrested, or searched without specific legal procedures.2
The Shinuiju Basic Law lays down similar provisions. In Article
4, the State shall guarantee all the legal rights and interests of
the residents and nonresidents of the SSAR. Article 5 of the law
provides that the personal safety of the residents and nonresi-
dents shall be safeguarded by law. With these provisions, basi-
cally, foreign partners may enjoy immunity from nationalization
and other taking of their property invested in the territory of
North Korea. Concerning foreign exchange control especially,
the FECL seems to follow the principle of obligations regarding
196. It reads that: "[t]he State shall protect by law the managerial secrets of for-
eign-invested enterprises and shall not disclose them without prior agreement with the
foreign investors." FIL, supra note 62, art. 21.
197. LEE, supra note 5, at 164-65.
198. It reads that: "[t]he State shall protect legal rights and interests of equity
joint venture enterprises." EJVL, supra note 106, art. 6, 2.
199. Originally, protection of the legal rights of foreign investors was more specifi-
cally laid down in Articles 3 and 4 of the North Korea's Joint Venture Law of 1984.
Article 3 of JVL governs the protection of the properties invested by foreign parties in
joint ventures and Article 4 ofJVL refers to the legal rights of the management activities
of the parties to joint ventures. See Kim Chin, North Korean Joint Venture Laws, 19 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 175, 178 (1989). For an English text of JVL, see PYONGYANG TIMES, Sept.
15, 1984.
200. It reads that: "[floreign exchange earned legally within the territory of the
DPRK shall be protected by law and may be inherited." FECL, supra note 195, art. 9.
201. See KICL, supra note 44, art. 8.
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exchange agreements prescribed at the International Monetary
Fund's present Articles of Agreement. 2°2 Notwithstanding, some
questions have been raised concerning the North Korea's regu-
lations for protecting foreign investment. First, the regulations
of compensation for the nationalization are ambiguous even if
compensated; for example, it would not be clear in which cur-
rency it would be paid. 20 3 Second, North Korea's foreign cur-
rency exchange system is not explained.20 4
2. Mutual Investment Protection Agreements between
the Two Koreas
Together with general regulations for protecting foreign in-
vestment, South Korea concluded a few provisional agreements
with North Korea. First, the Provisional Agreement of Invest-
ment Guarantee was signed between the two Koreas on Novem-
ber 11, 2000.25 With this Provisional Agreement, North and
South Korea agreed to permit investment and protect invest-
ment property according to law.206 It also regulates the Most Fa-
vored Nation treatment of investors, investment property, profits
and business activities of the other side. 207 Nationalization or
expropriation for a non-public purpose of the other side's invest-
ment shall be basically prohibited. Even in these cases, it should
be fully compensated without discrimination.20 ' This agreement
also guarantees the free and prompt remittance of investment
capital.20 9
Second, the Provisional Agreement of Double Taxation
Avoidance was concluded at the same day.2 10 Important con-
tents of the Provisional Agreement of Double Taxation Avoid-
202. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. TV. For more
details, see JOSEPH GOLD, LEGAL EFFECTS OF FLUCTUATING EXCHANGE RATES 9-20 (1990).
203. See STRATEGY FOR ENTERPRISES INVESTING IN NORTH KOREA 220 (You H.S. &
Lee Y.S. eds., 1997) (in Korean).
204. See Shin W.S., Foreign Currency Management in North Korea, 19 BUSINESS & L. 1,
10-12 (1995) (in Korean). See LEE, supra note 5, at 165-66.
205. For the full text of the Provisional Agreement of Commercial Dispute Settle-
ment between North and South Korea (available only in Korean), see ROK Ministry of
Unification, at http://www.unikorea.go.kr.
206. See Provisional Agreement of Investment Guarantee between North and
South Korea, art. 2 (2002).
207. Id. art. 3.
208. Id. art. 4.
209. Id. art. 5.
210. See THE CHOSUN ILBO, Nov. 11, 2000.
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ance are as follows. 2 11 The income exemption is adopted as a
method for double taxation avoidance; once tax is paid on one
side, the other side should not put the tax to the same in-
come. 212 Less than 10% of the tax rates will be applied to the
investment income including interest, dividend, and royalty, re-
gardless of the place where the income was earned. 213 In the
case of the income earned by inter-Korean transportation like
rail, shipping, or aviation, tax will be levied from the each side,
but reduced by 50% in the income-occurred place. 14 Tax will
not be levied on the incomes earned by business activities with-
out permanent establishment on the other side,215 entertainers
or sportsmen under the agreement between the authorities,2 1 6
independent human services, including lawyers, medical doc-
tors, or accountants217 and the labor of workers dispatched by a
side staying less than 183 days per annum on the other side. 218
Third, North and South Korea made the Provisional Agree-
ment of Commercial Dispute Settlement.219 Under this Provi-
sional Agreement, commercial disputes between the two Koreas
will be settled either out of court by negotiating with the parties
concerned, or by the North-South Commercial Arbitration Com-
mittee ("Arbitration Committee") .220 The Arbitration Commit-
tee may inquire into the case if either of the parties concerned
request arbitration, or investors call upon arbitration for the
non-enforcement of the investment guarantees by one of the au-
thorities.22 ' Unless the chairman of each side agrees, the Inter-
national Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("IC-
SID") shall appoint the head arbitrator by the request of the Ar-
211. A full text of the December 16, 2000 Provisional Agreement of Double Taxa-
tion Avoidance between North and South Korea may be found at the ROK Ministry of
Unification, at http://www.unikorea.go.kr/en/library/library.php?mode=view&page-
code=ue0501&ucd=eng0204&ewn-num=66 (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
212. See id. art. 22.
213. Id. art. 11(2).
214. Id. art. 8.
215. Id. art. 7.
216. Id. art. 17.
217. Id. art. 14.
218. Id. art. 15(2).
219. For the full text of the Provisional Agreement of Commercial Dispute Settle-
ment between North and South Korea (available only in Korean), see ROK Ministry of
Unification, at http://www.unikorea.go.kr (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
220. See id. art. 1.
221. Id. art. 8.
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bitration Committee.222 In addition, this agreement provides
the composition and functions of the Arbitration Committee,223
the arbitration procedure,2 2 4 the effect and enforcement of arbi-
221 226tration decisions, etc.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have discussed the new economic reforma-
tion law and the policies of North Korea through scrutinizing
the SEZs from an international legal perspective. In order to
overcome the harsh economic difficulties throughout the late
1990s, the Kim Jong-il regime promulgated the Reform Mea-
sures for Economic Management on July 1, 2002 and continued
to release new plans and initiatives for the improvement of the
North Korean economy. Those initiatives sometimes include
revolutionary changes to the dogmatic socialist economic system.
The establishment of the SEZs is considered the most far-reach-
ing reform measure that North Korea has taken to date, because
a lot of sub-reform measures would be implemented in the SEZs.
Four SEZs have been working or been under construction in
North Korea. Each SEZ has different characteristics. The Rajin-
Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone is the first SEZ in
North Korea and is still actively working to be an international
financial and trade center. The Shinuiju Special Administrative
Region is an autonomous governing unit under the Basic Law.
The State grants that region independent legislative, executive,
and judicial powers at least for fifty years. The economic system
of this region is fundamentally different from that of other parts
in North Korea. Based on the free enterprise system, the
Shinuiju Special Administrative Region would be developed into
a multilateral economic zone covering international finance,
trade, business, industry, science, entertainment, and tourism.
The Kaesung Industrial Complex is under construction. This
complex will cover multilateral sectors including manufacturing
industry, trade, commerce, finance, and tourism. A target coun-
try here is South Korea. North Korea expects to induce capital
and technology mainly from South Korea. Mt. Kumgangsan
222. Id. art. 10.
223. 7d. arts. 2-3.
224. Id. arts. 9-10.
225. Id. art. 14.
226. See LEE, supra note 5, at 172-73.
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Special Tourist Region is also under construction. The region
would not only be a comprehensive tourist complex, but also an
information technology center.
In the SEZs, foreign investors are permitted to be involved
in various businesses. Laws will support their business activities.
The basic regulations regarding foreign investment may be
found at the DPRK Law on Foreign Investment. The FIL lays
down the principles of complete equality and mutual benefit for
foreign investors doing business in the territory of North Korea.
Noticeable is the preferential treatment of tax in Articles 9 and
10 of the law. Together, the LFETZ provides general rules cov-
ering the SEZs. Following these legal instruments, North Korea
enacted the laws for the three forms of foreign investment -
Equity Joint Venture, Contracture Joint Venture, and Foreign
Enterprise - in the SEZs. Other business activities may be per-
mitted according to the special purposes of each SEZ.
A controversial problem in the course of foreign investment
is the protection against political risks. Due to the current politi-
cal disturbance, including the nuclear crisis, foreign investors
would be quite nervous their investments could not be guaran-
teed in this time of political instability. Foreign investors may
invoke both the principles of general international law and spe-
cific legal methods for protecting their legal rights in North Ko-
rea. Laws relating to the SEZs fortunately stipulate specific regu-
lations for foreign investment guarantees; e.g., nationalization of
private properties shall be basically prohibited.
The significance of the SEZs may be looked at from two dif-
ferent perspectives. First, foreign investors can take advantage of
the SEZs because the authorities of the zones are expected to
induce active capital investment from foreign countries in vari-
ous fields of industry. Second, the SEZs will be important bases
of human exchange. Foreign enterprises from both South Ko-
rea and other countries could utilize the low-wage labor force if
investing in these zones. Eventually, North Korea is supposed to
promote mutual interests in products and trade through the
SEZs.
The establishment of the SEZs is an on-going project of
North Korea. It is expected to be a stepping stone of North Ko-
rea's open-door policy. The steady development of the SEZs
would be a promising footing for them to cooperate more ac-
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tively in connection with an international scheme. With the
SEZs, North Korea may hope to be a true member of the inter-
national community. People in the West seem to be negative
towards the SEZs of North Korea, because the current political
situation is very unstable. If successful, however, the SEZs would
help North Korea overcome its economic difficulties and con-
struct mutually profitable political ties with the outside world.
The success of the SEZs may be dependent on the decision of
North Korea's political leadership as well as advanced legal ar-
rangements. The peaceful resolution of the current nuclear cri-
sis will also be the key to promoting foreign businesses in the
SEZs. The time is coming to seriously consider the twenty-first
century's relations for real economic cooperation and prosper-
ity.
